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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON COMBAT TRAINING READINESS

BY

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by

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Professor Douglas B. Campbell Project Advisor

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ABSTRACT

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Every commander, soldier, and unit in a force-projection Army must be trained and ready to deploy. All concerned share this solemn responsibility. Commanders must remember that their primary mission is always to prepare for, fight, and win America's wars. This rigorous task requires nothing less than the highest priority when training and equipping the forces. 100-5, Operations, along with other Army doctrine and Joint doctrine document the criticality of preparedness. However, both sets of doctrine also define another commitment, a "non-lethal" operation called Operations Other Than War (OOTW). As we continue to deploy on these "other" operations, we must continually assess their impact on the primary mission. study describes some OOTW impacts on training readiness through interviews with those who have served in OOTWs. This study is based on the results of a survey distributed to the US Army War College students from the 1997 and 1998 year groups. The study identifies a wide-spread and significant "cost" of OOTW in training readiness with recovery time ranging from 71/2 weeks to 13 weeks. However, the survey also describes a changing Army. Doctrine may be changing from below through the initiative of unit commanders and their training plans.

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THE TRAINING AND READINESS CHALLENGE

"On the day of battle, soldiers and units will fight as well or as poorly as they are trained. Training to high standards is essential in both peace and war; never can Army forces afford not to train and maintain the highest level of readiness. Every commander, every soldier, every unit in a force-projection Army must be trained and ready to deploy. This may be their most solemn responsibility". This charge set forth in the base Army doctrine manual, FM 100-5: OPERATIONS, is clear. The base document specifies two tasks: First, the Army fights and wins our nations wars; second, it carries out a range of activities of a general nature designated "operations other than war" (OOTW).2 In fact these OOTW were considered so distinct and separate that they required a chapter all thier own in the OPERATIONS (Jun 93) edition of FM 100-5. Perhaps this duality, this doctrinal distinction is the origin of the current training readiness dichotomy. The question for commanders is for which of these two tasks should you train?

THE NATURE OF FUTURE CONFLICTS

"Peace operations are irrelevant to the Army of the future," observed a senior Army leader speaking to members of the class of 1998 at the AWC. Yet other senior leaders tell us that "non-traditional/non-conventional operations are on the rise. Do we train for major theater war (MTW)? Or do we train for OOTW?

Since the turn of the century, we have been engaged in five conflicts called wars: two world wars, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. However, we have been involved in over 200 contingencies, such as the Cuban Missile crisis, along with operations in El Salvador, Iran, Grenada, Honduras and Nicaragua, Colombia, Panama, Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia — to mention a few. Many national leaders have opined that peace operations, which are not normally defined as conflicts, will become the norm. The dichotomy persists.

THE TRAINING READINESS DICHOTOMY

Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, states that OOTW include a wide range of challenging operations for which US forces need to be prepared. Strategists expect that the Armed Forces of the United States will increasingly participate in these operations. However, commanders must remember that their primary mission will always be to prepare for, and to fight and win America's wars. This is the military's most rigorous task; it requires nothing less than top priority when training and equipping our forces. Much of Army doctrine and Joint doctrine however indicates that OOTW are difficult and challenging and that they require skills beyond those developed in our normal training tasks. Yet the primary task always remains to train to fight and win the nation's wars. In preparing to fight the nation's wars, the Army develops the leadership, organizations, equipment, discipline, and skills for a variety of operations. Doctrine for war largely complements

that for operations other than war. 5 A key question in this debate is, whether training for or conducting an operation in one of these activities affect the training and preparation for the other. Many senior leaders declared that "Peace operations (a type of OOTW) degrade conventional skills, if someone tells you otherwise, he has just not done it."6 However, a publication of the Joint Warfighting Center contends that "Training for peace operations may not be entirely different from training for warfighting except that the uniqueness of peace operations requires warrior training to be expanded and enhanced."7 Thus Army commanders face a training dilemma: Should we expand warrior training beyond the mission essential task list (METL)? Or does the expanded OOTW training negatively affect METL training, thereby taking time away from preparing for our primary mission? Answers to these questions influence current training readiness issues. They may well affect doctrine and force structure tomorrow. We have defined in doctrine (FM 100-5) two operations, war and OOTW. Are these really two separate operations? Or are they two operations connected along a continuum?

While the debate on doctrine, training, and readiness rages, many officers find themselves perplexed in meeting their responsibility for training units and soldiers. The trainer's dilemma is, whether to take time away from warfighting METL tasks to train for OOTW. Or should he concentrate exclusively on warfighting METL tasks. This study explores the impact of OOTW

on combat training readiness by asking those who have done it. This study is based upon information from members of the Classes of 1997 and 1998, US Army War College, who have been engaged in OOTW operations. Their comments have ranged from "enhanced combat skills" to "had severe negative impact". Many colleagues remain unsure of the value or impact of OOTW on readiness. At the very least, this study should inform the debate—even though no easy resolution is at hand.

METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW

After reviewing LTC Alan Landry's 1997 Army War College research project titled Informing the Debate: The Impact of Operations Other Than War on Combat Training Readiness, I decided to validate his data, expand the survey population to the Class of 1998, and update the conclusions of his project. LTC Landry's survey questionnaire (Appendix A: 1997 Survey) asked twenty-seven questions divided into four sections: population data, pre-deployment, training readiness during OOTW, and post-deployment. I updated the survey instrument to improve its clarity and validity, adding one question on common skills training during the OOTW and another on OOTW's impact on a unit's physical fitness.

This survey was distributed to the US students at the Army War College, Class of 1998. One hundred and twenty-seven were returned, with the following mix: 103 Active Army, 4 Army Reserve, 3 Army National Guard, 1 Army Civilian, 7 Navy, 5


Marine, and 4 Air Force. Data from each of the surveys were entered into a Microsoft® ACCESS database. The survey data is found in Appendix B. Survey responses from the Classes of 1997 and 1998 were analyzed, compared and contrasted. The findings drawn from this comparison are very interesting and enlightening, offering insight into the dichotomy.

THE CORE GROUP: ACTIVE ARMY OFFICERS WITH OOTW EXPERIENCE

In the active Army group, the core group, 75 participated in an OOTW, while 33 did not participate. Six of the 33 provided answers in the post-deployment part of the survey relating to recovery operations, since as they joined their units after redeployment to home stations.

Comparison of the surveys from the 1997 and 1998 classes shows vast differences in population, with correspondingly different ideas and experiences. Fifty-seven Active Army respondents in 1997 stated they were in one OOTW, while only one respondent provided data on two operations. The 1998 population yielded 36 with one OOTW, 24 reported two, and 15 deployed on three OOTWs. Thirty-six percent of the 1998 population had more than one OOTW, while the previous year's class had only one percent. This is a significant difference: the 1998 population represents a group with multiple OOTW experience. This data further reflects the tremendous increase in operational tempo

(OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). A single year produced a vast difference.







Figure 1: Number of OOTWs

Another notable difference is that a plurality (over 40%) of the students from 1997 deployed to humanitarian assistance operations, while peacekeeping and peace enforcement made up 22% and 15% of the experience. In the Class of 1998, less than 25%







Figure 2: Operation Type

of its respondents were involved with humanitarian assistance, with greater numbers involved in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, 38% and 21%. This difference represents a substantial and significant change in mission types, yielding different experiences and training requirements.

The core group for the 1998 survey is made up of 35 (43%) battalion commanders, 4 battalion exectuive offices, 9 battalion

staff and 27 classified as others (Div G3, Bde S3s, TF Commanders). Twenty percent served in combat heavy units, 28% in combat light, 27% in combat support, 17% in combat service support, 3% in special operations, and nearly 5% in health services. Ten respondents marked Other (Aviation [3], Patriot ADA [2], and higher headquarters [5]) as their service location. As Figure 3 shows, a total of 48% of the 1998 respondents were in combat units, opposed to 40% in 1997.







Figure 3: Type of unit

Comparaison of the two populations demonstrates that the combined surveys broaden our view of OOTW and thier impact on combat training readiness.

SECTION I: PRE-DEPLOYMENT

Questions in this section focus on OOTW training readiness and mission essential task list (METL) preparedness prior to departure. The first question in this section (5) asks if the unit METL included tasks required for OOTWs. As seen in figure 4, 52% of the class of 1998 stated that many of their unit's METL

supported OOTW tasks. This evidence sustains the assertion that normal METL training supports OOTW tasks.






Figure 4: METL tasks include OOTW tasks

However, the 1998 finding is significantly decreased from the 64% shown from the 1997 population. Perhaps this decrease is related to the type of operation.

The next question (6) asks respondents if the OOTW required critical OOTW tasks that were not in unit METL and, if so, to identify the tasks. Both classes stated that nearly 40% of the critical OOTW tasks were not in unit METLs. In fact, comparison of the two groups indicates that the inadequacy of the METL may be slightly increasing, 38% vs. 41%. Thus while pre-deployment METL training supports many of the OOTW tasks (60%), this training is still deficient in many critical OOTW tasks. Appendix C lists OOTW skills to enable trainers to identify critical OOTW tasks that may not be in unit METLs.

"How did your unit primarily train for critical OOTW tasks?", question (7), reveals a very significant difference in findings.


The 1997 population indicated 30% used special ramp-up training;

53% responded they used normal METL training; while 16% noted they did on-the-job training (OJT). In 1998, the data showed a significant increase in special ramp-up training to 38%; a decrease on normal METL training to 51%, while OJT decreased to 11%. Significantly, units are now preparing specifically for OOTWs: Special training averaged over six weeks, while normal METL training decreased. While the drop in METL training averages only 3 percent, the trend indicates that units in the field are doing less preparation for their primary warfighting mission.

This year's data showed that, 69% of the 1998 respondents reported their units were combat ready for normal METL skills, with 31% combat-ready with minor limitations. The 1997 group showed 64% combat ready, 32% with minor limitations, with 4% not combat ready. This indicates that while normal METL training is decreasing, the 1998 respondents nonetheless felt that they were still mission ready. This dichotomy is quite disconcerting and leads to another possible conclusion. Perhaps the 1998 population have been to so many OOTWs they measure combat readiness in terms of thier unit's OOTW performance.

The next question (9) relating to training readiness in OOTW skills shows an interesting trend (See figure 5). While the number of respondents who felt fully trained increased (probably due to the special ramp-up training), the number of respondents reporting significant shortfalls or untrained in OOTW skills

increased from 7% to 9%. It appears that the involved units are doing focused OOTW training; nevertheless, some key and critical tasks are being overlooked. Again, trainers should review the list of critical OOTW tasks identified in Appendix C.







Figure 5: 00TW training readiness

The last question (10) in the predeployment section also reveals a notable finding. Both populations were asked how their pre-deployment training was assessed. We have noted the 1997 population deployed mostly on humanitarian assistance operations, which were typically short-notice: Thus 19% did not assess their readiness before departing. Forty-one percent of the 1997







Figure 6: Pre deployment method of assessment - training readiness

group completed formal external evaluations: 18% ARTEP, and 23% a CTC rotation. The 1998 finding shows a significant decrease in the "not assessed" response; however, formal evaluations were down from 41% to 29%. In view of the increased effort to prepare for OOTW predeployment training, it is astonishing that formal evaluations decreased this significantly. Another remarkable piece of information has been the significant increase in the computer simulations to assess readiness.

Section I showed that unit commanders generally felt they were prepared for OOTWs and wartime tasks. They felt that normal METL training does support OOTW, but not fully. The 1998 population shows training readiness for normal METL skills improved; they indicated that they were more "fully trained" in OOTW training readiness than previous respondents. However, a significant change is occurring: Less time is being allocated to METL skills, while the special OOTW ramp-up training is increasing dramatically. Yet there is still a concern among some respondents that there were significant shortfalls in their OOTW training tasks. In addition, there is a significant decrease in formal external evaluations. Without the external objective analysis of unit training readiness prior to deployment, it is difficult to validly assess effects of the OOTW.

SECTION II: OOTW DEPLOYMENT

Seven questions in this section seek to ascertain the training opportunities available during an OOTW. The first question (12) asks how METL training opportunities while deployed compared to those at home station. More than 60% of respondents stated that compared to home station the training opportunities while deployed were less to non-existent. Since METL related training is very perishable and must be maintained and sustained (see FM 25-100: "Training the Force"), this information indicates a much greater training effort is required to achieve full METL capability. Further, respondents who indicate METL training was non-existent increased from 2% to 7%, a significant disturbing increase. It is clear the units of the 1998 group were involved






Figure 7: METL training during the OOTW


in significant pre-deployment OOTW training. Coupled with an increasing lack of METL training while deployed, this leads to the conclusion that a significant amount of time passes during which METL task training is not performed or evaluated.

The next question (13) asks whether units conducted non-METL training during the OOTW. Both populations reported that about 36% indicated they trained from a moderate to great degree on non-METL tasks, while 64% said to a small degree or not at all. As in the previous finding, it appears that during OOTW there is little time for either METL or non-METL training.

Question 14 was added to the 1997 survey, so no comparison data is available. It asks the 1998 population if their unit conducted common skills training (such as weapon qualifications, PT and NBC training) during OOTW. Forty-three percent (31) said they trained common skills tasks to a great degree, 17% (12) to some degree, 27% (19) to a moderate degree, and 13% (9) not at all. Based upon this data, there appears to be considerable emphasis on soldier and individual training to maintain soldier skill standards.

The next question (15) asked the respondents to assess the overall impact of OOTW on their units' combat training readiness. Comparison of the two populations indicates that 65% of the 1997 group believed that OOTW degraded combat operations, while 55% of the 1998 population had that same perception. While less in 1998, the data still shows that more than 50% of both populations are concerned about the impact of OOTW on combat operations. Further, the increase of those reporting no impact on ability to conduct combat operations rose from 3% to triple that, 9%, which reveals that increasing numbers of Army leaders believe that OOTW

does not have a negative impact on combat readiness. In fact, the 1998 population believes that OOTWs substantially improved or improved combat training readiness at a higher rate than 1997. This indicates that while leaders are deeply concerned with the issue, an increasing proportion does not perceive OOTW as a degradation from combat readiness. This is an interesting finding, since responses to the previous three questions report a







Figure 8: OOTW affects on combat readiness

lack of training time during OOTWs. Perhaps respondents feel that since METL tasks support 60% of OOTW tasks, therefore the reverse is also true. Perhaps those who have done OOTW are re-defining doctrine, stating that OOTW falls on a continuum that includes lethal operations. In any case, this issue requires additional study to identify why an increasing number of officers are finding OOTW a method to improve combat readiness.

Question 16 asks which skill levels were significantly enhanced or degraded or remained the same due to the OOTW. Both

populations report that individual to platoon-level skills were enhanced during OOTW, while company and battalion skills were degraded. This is interesting because both populations (the humanitarian assistance heavy 1997 population and the peace enforcement and peacekeeping heavy population of 1998) indicate that the breakpoints of skill degradation are between the platoon/company level. This finding indicates a broad congruence regarding the skill degradation breakpoint. This information can help trainers put together more enhanced pre- and post-operation training plans.






Figure 9: Skill level affected by an OOTW

To further analyze this breakpoint, see the table below which highlights the unit type for both year groups and the skill degradation percentages. This shows that while the breakpoint of skill degradation and enhancement is at the platoon/company level for combat heavy forces for both populations; the combat light result is significantly different. In the PE/PK population (1998), the light force breakpoint occurs at crew level. This

Degraded Skills	Individual		Crew		Squad		Plateon		Company	Bn
Year	1997	1998	1997	1996	1997	1998	1997	1998	1997	1998 1997 1998
Unit types										
Combat (Heavy)	0%	9%	30%	9%	10%	25%	50%	27%	60%	70% 50% 78%
Combat (Light)	16%	40%	18%	67%	9%	50%	36%	50%	63%	54% 82% 59%
Combat Support	69%	60%	33%	60%	15%	54%	30%	33%	15%	60% 23% 57%
CSS	16%	62%	8%	30%	8%	30%	16%	33%	25%	30% 25% 67%
Special Operations	57%	50%	42%	0%	71%	50%	42%	0%	42%	0% 42% 100%

Table 1: Skill Degradation: Percent Degraded vs. Enhanced indicates that light forces suffer greater skill degradation in PE/PK than they do in humanitarian operations. The 1998 combat support unit respondents report that almost all skill levels suffer skill degradation at the 50 percentile and greater, except at the platoon level. The 1998 combat service support respondents report degraded skills at the individual and battalion levels, but still report mostly enhanced skills at crew, squad, platoon, and company levels. The 1997 data shows CSS units mostly enhanced their skills during OOTWs through all unit levels. This detailed data, different from the macro view, demonstrates that each OOTW is different, with differing effects on unit types and skill levels. This data can help focus training plans for units involved with a specific OOTW.

The next question (17) asks if the OOTW tasks complemented the critical go-to-war tasks. Comparison of the responses again shows the more recent population has a greater degree of comfort with the correlation of PE/PK operations and go-to-war tasks.

Nearly 76% of the 1998 group felt that OOTW tasks complemented their critical tasks, compared to 60% for 1997. Clearly the 1998

respondents felt that PE/PK operations are close to the skill sets of combat operations. This is rather different from the humanitarian assistance 1997 population.

The last question (18) in this section asks about normal readiness reporting, indicating whether units used the standard Unit Status Reports (USR). The 1997 population stated that 42% did not use the standard USR or did not report at all, compared to only 19% for the 1998 group. It appears the importance of the USR during these deployments has been acknowledged. The USR is accepted throughout the Army as the key measurement tool for readiness. This result indicates that the Army is viewing OOTW deployments as normal operations and that regular USR submissions are required and especially important during OOTW deployments.


Responses to Section II lead to some perplexing conclusions: Generally both populations agreed that there is little time while deployed on OOTW to do training other than common skills and solider training. Both populations identified the skill degradation/enhancement point at the platoon/company level. But similarities end at this point. While the 1997 population clearly recognizes OOTW as a detractor from combat readiness, the 1998 respondents are less inclined to report degradation. In fact, the large majority believe that OOTWs complement their goto-war skills. This is an interesting finding. Since it is clear that OOTW allow less time for sustainment/maintenance training in both OOTW and METL tasks and that OOTW operations

degrade combat skills above company level. Nonetheless, 1998 respondents believe that OOTW complements training for war. This seems to be counter-intuitive. Why would the 1998 class draw this conclusion? Perhaps perspectives of doctrine between lethal and non-lethal operations are getting a bit fuzzy, lacking distinction, by officers serving at this level.

SECTION III: POST-DEPLOYMENT

This section focuses on reconstitution efforts after an OOTW deployment. Post-deployment recovery operations are an integral part of the deployment and must be planned from the start. Comments from the two populations may assist trainers in working this plan.

The first question (19) in this section asks how long the respondents' units engaged in recovery training. The responses







Figure 10: Post deployment recovery time allocated show that recovery time varied widely, with the majority of respondents reporting between no recovery and 4 weeks. This short a recovery period is quite remarkable. As noted in the

previous section, the decrease of METL training and degradation of skills at the company and battalion levels during the OOTW indicates the need for additional time to train and evaluate collective skills as compared to the 1997 responses, not less time. If we look at the detailed data, unit type, we note the largest sector of combat heavy forces (33%) with a 24-week recovery period; 52% of combat light indicated they had between a one- and two-week recovery; and most combat support and combat service support units reported 4-week recovery. This indicates that there is a significant difference in dedicated recovery time depending on unit type: light forces, combat support and combat service support units require barely one month to recover from an OOTW.

In response to whether the time allocated for post-deployment training was sufficient to restore the unit to full combat readiness in personnel, equipment, and training, 25 to 30 percent of both populations report the time allotted was insufficient to restore personnel to full combat readiness. From the 1997 and 1998 respondents, respectively, insufficient time for equipment readiness increased from 26% to 36%, and insufficient training time went from 34% to nearly 50%. Why was there such a large increase in this factor? This finding seems somewhat inconsistent, considering the 1998 population in sections I and II believed they were better prepared METL training-wise then the 1997 population. Although the 1998 respondents felt they







Figure 11: Recovery time sufficiency

were mission-ready at a higher rate and that OOTWs substantially improved combat readiness and complemented their go-to-war tasks, more of them are reporting insufficient recovery time. Clearly additional study is required.

We asked (question 21) respondents to list their units' principal training detractors after the OOTW. Appendix D itemizes these responses. Many and varied detractors are reported. However, the predominant ones appear to be personnel shortages and personnel turnover.

When asked how the respondents units' training readiness was assessed after the OOTW, the 1997 data showed that 47% of the units were formally evaluated by means of ARTEPs and CTC rotations. By comparison, the 1998 population shows very few formal evaluations (24%), with the units depending on unit commander evaluations and exercises. This may answer the question "How can commanders judge their units to be combat ready

after such a short recovery period?" No formal external assessment of readiness was made. As we have observed, lacking







Figure 12: Post deployment method of assessment - training readiness

formal evaluations before and after deployment, it becomes very difficult to objectively measure training degradation.

A question (23) was added to this year's survey to ascertain whether OOTWs have a measurable impact on a unit's physical fitness. Seven percent (5) said they detected a large improvement in unit fitness. Thirteen percent (9) said they saw a small improvement, 37% (27) answered no impact, 26% (19) reported a small decrease in fitness, and 17% (12) noted a large decrease in unit physical fitness. The center of mass of the data falls on the no impact to small decrease. Thus it appears that OOTWs do not have a significantly negative impact on a unit's physical readiness, although many unit commanders have been vocal regarding OOTW deployments' impact on physical conditioning.

The next question (24) asks how long it would take, after the redeployment, to successfully execute an ARTEP, a CTC rotation, or a (MTW) major theater war. The 1998 population reports a significantly reduced level of preparation time than did the 1997 group. In fact, the reported preparation times are 40-50% less. Reports of decreased preparation time may be attributed to the difference between OOTWs conducted: humanitarian assistance versus PE/PK operations. This is an interesting issue. The 1998 population is less negatively influenced with the OOTWs impact on combat readiness than the 1997 respondents. While the







Figure 13: Required preparation time for ARTEP/CTC/MTW

1998 population believes it requires about four weeks to recover from an OOTW, they report a need for 6 to 7 weeks of reconstitution (50% to 75% more time then "recovery") to be ready for redeployment to an MTW. Comparison of responses to the next question further supports the conclusion that the 1998 group feel less negatively influenced by OOTW. When asked that in the event the respondents' units had to deploy to a MTW prior to the time noted in the previous question, what would be the impact of the

training readiness shortfalls on the wartime mission. The 1998 population felt that there would be more mission success with few casualties: These responses rose from 49% to 52%. Although this is a slight increase, 50% of the respondents felt they could accomplish the highest level of mission success on an MTW even






Figure 14: Impact of training shortfall on mission with incompleted recovery training.

We next asked respondents if they believe that OOTW tasks should be included in their unit METL. The 1998 responses shows an increase in those saying no: Thirty-three percent of the 1997 respondents were saying no, while 37% of the 1998 respondents said no. Even so, it is relevant to note that still more than 60% of both populations felt that OOTW tasks should be included in unit METLs. When asked what percent of warfighting METL tasks respondents would be willing to neglect in order to train to the OOTW tasks, the responses are quite significant. In the 1998 population, 19% of the respondents said they would neglect none of their warfighting METL tasks, 29% would give up 10% METL

tasks, while 21% would neglect as much as 30% of their warfighting METL tasks in order to train for OOTW tasks. This willingness to sacrifice METL for OOTW training is significantly greater than the 1997 population response, which is




Figure 15: Percent METL tasks willing to neglect 11-15%. Again we see confirmation that the 1998 respondents believe OOTW had less effect on combat readiness than the 1997 population.

The last question asked if respondents want to cite any other issues regarding OOTW training readiness. Responses were widely varied. Below are a few significant answers (see the remaining responses in Appendix E):

-Turnover, turbulence, and delayed change of commands are significant issues.

-Even though there are crossover skills, OOTW task/training are different than war tasks; therefore, they are additive to METL, not substitutes or subsumed in other training.

-We need to come up with other options for executing OOTW, particularly PK and PM. For example, why not designate two divisions in JSCP as forces for PKO.

SECTION IV: RECOMPILATION

These surveys offer good evidence for assessing the impacts of OOTWs on combat training and readiness. Comparisons of both years' data provide more than the anecdotal observations of "enhanced" or "severe negative impact" on combat readiness. The data shows that Army leaders increasingly believe they are prepared for both OOTWs and wartime tasks. The 1998 respondents are concerned that exclusive, conventional METL training does not allow commanders to train their units in critical OOTW tasks which they recognize are going to be their primary occupation. Unfortunately, the majority of this group's unit had not undergone formal assessments prior to OOTW deployment or after return; therefore no formal baseline data has been established. During deployment there appeared to be little time for sustainment training in either OOTW tasks or METL tasks. lack of sustainment training lead to skill degradation primarily at the company and battalion levels. However, the 1998 population believes that even given these impacts, OOTW do complement their go-to-war tasks, even though their responses acknowledge shortfalls in METL training. It appears that OOTW deployments are becoming so normal that the 1998 group did not undergo formal evaluations to objectively measure METL skill degradation or thier units' ability to execute warfighting missions. While both year groups felt that four weeks recovery was too short for a proper reconstitution effort, the 1998 group

stated that 7½ weeks are needed to prepare their units to successfully engage in an MTW. This time is nearly 50% less that reported by the 1997 group. In addition, the 1998 group indicated that even without the 7½ weeks, they would still be able to achieve mission success at a greater level than the 1997 group thought possible. The 1998 population felt confident enough in their METL skills that they on average would be willing to neglect more than 11-30% of the METL training time to train for OOTW task training.

SECTION V: CONCLUSIONS

LTC Landry concluded that OOTW's have predictable and measurable costs associated with them, albeit the costs will vary based on unit type and OOTW. This report supports LTC Landry's conclusion. This year's respondents believe that the negative impact of OOTW is not quite as large as the 1997 population thought, and it is clear from the data that the type of OOTW influences the respondents' views. However, another conclusion can be drawn from the comparison of the two year groups: OOTWs are being accepted as normal military tasks. That the 1998 group is willing to neglect 20% or more of their METL tasks to train for OOTW tasks is quite revealing. The training issue, train for war or OOTW, is still very much alive: The current group of future senior leaders regards OOTW as complementary to go-to-war tasks. Perhaps a new paradigm regarding doctrine is emerging.

Future doctrine may not separate OOTW into a distinct section of the base manual, but will describe an operational continuum.

In any case, it is apparent that four weeks recovery after an OOTW is insufficient to restore training readiness. Both groups specified at least 7½ weeks to 13 weeks as the reconstitution time necessary to recover the training element of readiness. Commanders and leaders need to plan for and protect this time, fence it and fight for it if units are to be ready to execute their primary mission, to fight and win the nation's wars.

SECTION VI: RECOMMENDATIONS

The 1997 and 1998 populations report sharp differences regarding METL training and readiness and the impact of OOTW on readiness. If commanders see OOTW as complementing their warfighting skills, training readiness, which has always been somewhat subjectively determined, may be skewed. Regardless of senior leadership's declarations, as units continue to do multiple OOTWs, unit commanders will view these tasks as their mission training requirements. Thus the dichotomy remains: train for peace or train for war. The evidence is clear: The Army in the field is voting with its training plans. To make the best of this situation, we should seriously consider the following recommendations:

1. Expand this survey to next year's AWC class to further validate the data. Ensure that more than two data points

are obtained for a clearer view on the issue. Continue to "inform the debate".

- 2. Ensure that unit commanders formally validate their training readiness.
- 3. Review doctrine! End the debate. Should peace operations be included along a continuum of warfighting tasks, warfare at the sub-lethal level? Or should they be included in a separate chapter of doctrine. The current debate and current operations are affecting our subjective measure of "unit training readiness."

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- ³ This quote is taken from the remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series.
- ⁴ Stofft, William A., Commandant U.S. Army War College. "Nature of Future Conflict." Memorandum for General Franks, Commander U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 12 November 1993.
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Appendix A: 1997 Sample Survey

Dear Classmates: I am preparing an SRP on the effect of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) training readiness. As part of my research, I am surveying the members our class for those with personal experiences in this area. Please answ the following questions to the best of your ability; feel free to atta additional information if you desire. This issue is critical to a numb of ongoing strategic debates such as force structure, force siz training, OOTW rotations, OOTW recovery operations, and reallocation forces from OOTW to a MRC. Please return to BOX 178 NLT 24 January 199 For additional information, you may contact me via comail (landrya) or 258-1402. Thanks in advance for your help.	on of er ch er e, of
Al Landry	
1. What is your <u>branch</u> of Service: [] Army [] Navy [] Air Force [] USMC [] Other (specify)	j
2. What is your component: [] Active [] Reserve	
3. Have you ever participated in an OOTW (if " no" please go to question): [] Yes (list type below)	
5. What type of unit did you serve with during the OOTW deployment (mark all that apply): [] Combat (heavy) [] Combat (light) [] Combat Support [] Combat Service Support [] SOF [] CONUS based [] Europe based [] other location (specify)	:
PREDEPLOYMENT QUESTIONS:	
6. Did your unit METL include tasks required for the OOTW? [] None [] Few [] Most [] All	
7. Did the OOTW require <u>critical tasks</u> not listed in your unit METL? [No [] Yes (list below) (a)(b)(c)(c)	

Appendix A: 1997 Sample Survey
8. How did your unit primarily train for critical OOTW tasks: [] Normal METL training program [] Special ramp up:
9. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's training readiness on normal METL skills: [] combat ready [] combat ready with minor limitations
10. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's <u>training readiness</u> in critical <u>OOTW Skills</u> : [] Fully trained [] Trained (minor shortfalls) [] Significan shortfalls [] Untrained
11. How was your pre-deployment training readiness assessed: [] ARTEP [] CTC rotation [] other (specify) [] not assessed
DURING OOTW DEPLOYMENT
12. Compared to home station, METL task training opportunities during the OOTW were: [] Greater [] Same [] Somewhat less than [] Much less than [] Non-existent
13. Did your unit conduct other training (such as non-METL OOTW task training) during the OOTW: [] Not at all
14. Assess the overall impact of the OOTW on your unit's combat training readiness: [] no impact [] improved overall combat training readiness [] minimally degraded combat training readiness [] substantially degraded combat training readiness
15. Which skills were significantly enhanced by the OOTW: [] Individual [] Crew [] Squad [] Platoon [] Company [] Battalion [] other
6. Which skills were significantly degraded by the OOTW: [] Individual [] Crew [] Squad [] Platoon [] Company [] Battalion [] other

Appendix	A:	1997	Sample	Survey
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17. To what extent did your OOTW tasks complement or replicate your critical go-to-war tasks:
[] Not at all [] To a small degree [] To some degree
18. During the OOTW, were normal Unit Status Report reporting standards and criteria used to report readiness:[] No [] Yes (specify)
POST DEPLOYMENT These questions apply to those who either deployed, or joined a unit in post-deployment recovery:
19. After your unit returned, how long was your unit's dedicated recovery period: [] no recovery [] 1 week [] 2 weeks [] 3 weeks [] 1 month [] 2 months [] months
20. Was the time allotted sufficient to restore your unit to full combat readiness in the following categories: Personnel: [] Yes [] No Equipment: [] Yes [] No Training: [] Yes [] No
21. What were the main factors which degraded unit training readiness after the OOTW (please list): (a) (b)
22. How was your unit's training readiness assessed after recovery: [] ARTEP
23. How soon after the return of your unit do you believe it would have been able to successfully execute a(n): a. ARTEP: b. CTC Rotation (NTC/CMTC/JRTC): c. MRC:
24. Had your unit been called upon to deploy to an MRC <u>prior</u> to the time you listed above, do you think the impact of <u>training readiness shortfalls</u> would have resulted in: [] mission failure [] mission success with moderate casualties [] mission success with moderate casualties [] mission success with few casualties

25. Do you beli [] No	ieve that <u>OOTW ta</u> [] Yes	sks should	be included in	unit MET	<u>Ls</u> :
26. Given reali METL tasks are tasks (circle	istic time constr you willing to n	aints, wha	t <u>percent of yo</u> order to train	ur warfig to these	hting OOTW
010	20	30	40	50	6
27. Are there comment on?	any other OOTW t	raining re	adiness issues	you would	like to

Appendix A: 1997 Sample Survey

Dear Classmates:

12 Nov. 1997

Suspense: 24 Nov. 1997

I am preparing an SRP on the effect of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) on training readiness. This issue is critical to a number of ongoing strategic debates such as force structure, force size, training, OOTW rotations, OOTW recovery operations, and reallocation of forces from OOTW to a MRC.

As part of my research, I am surveying the members of our class for those with personal experiences in this area. Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability; feel free to attach additional information if you desire.

Please return to BOX 282, NLT 24 November 1997. For additional information, you may contact me via ccmail (walshmj1) or at 240-0619. Thanks in advance for your help.

Mike Walsh/ Seminar 13

- 1. What is your **branch** of Service:
- [111] Army
- [007] Navy
- [004] Air Force
- [005] USMC
- [000] Other (specify)
- 2. What is your component:
- [119] Active
- [004] Reserve
- [003] Guard
- [001] Civilian
- 3. Have you ever participated in an Operation Other Than War (OOTW)?
- [35] Yes, one OOTW
- [23] Yes, <u>two</u> OOTW
- [15] Yes, three or more
- [33] No Please go to Question # 19

Please answer the following 26 questions separately for each OOTW in which you participated.

4a. Operation (name):

4b. Operation Type: [18] humanitarian assistance [29] peacekeeping [16] peace enforcement [11] domestic support [03] other: specify:
4c. Duration of your involvement: (MM/YY- MM/YY):
4d. Position (i.e., Bn Cdr., XO):;
4e. Type of Unit [13] Combat (heavy); [18] Combat (light); [17] Combat Support; [11] Combat Service Support; [02] Special Operations [03] Health Services [00] Other: Specify: 4f. Unit normal basing: [29] CONUS based [29] Europe based
[15] Other location (specify)
PREDEPLOYMENT QUESTIONS:
5. Did your unit METL include tasks required for the OOTW? [13] None [21] Few [15] Many [12] Most [10] All
Did the OOTW require <u>critical tasks</u> not listed in your unit METL? [42] No [29] Yes (list below) (a) (b) (c)
7. How did your unit primarily train for critical OOTW tasks: [34] Normal METL training program [25] Special ramp up: weeks [07] OJT on location [03] Other: Specify:

- 8. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's <u>training readiness</u> on <u>normal METL skills:</u>
- [49] Combat ready
- [22] Combat ready with minor limitations
- [00] Not combat ready
- 9. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's <u>training readiness</u> in critical **OOTW Skills:**
- [24] Fully trained
- [40] Trained (minor shortfalls)
- [06] Significant shortfalls
- [01] Untrained
- 10. How was your pre-deployment training readiness assessed: (select one)
- [13] ARTEP
- [22] CTC rotation
- [27] Exercises
- [08] Computer simulation
- [37] Cdr.'s assessment
- [06] Not assessed
- [00] Other: (specify):

DURING OOTW DEPLOYMENT

- 12. Compared to home station, <u>METL task training opportunities during</u> the OOTW were:
- [09] Much greater
- [12] Greater
- [05] Same
- [20] Less
- [22] Much less
- [05] Non-existent
- 13. Did your unit conduct other training (such as non-METL OOTW task training) during the OOTW:
- [16] Not at all
- [29] Small degree
- [20] Moderate degree
- [06] Great degree

- 14. Did your unit specifically address <u>common task skills</u> such as weapon qualifications, PT and NBC training:
- [09] Not at all
- [19] Moderate degree
- [12] Some degree
- [31] Great degree
- 15. Assess the overall impact of the OOTW on your unit's combat
 training readiness:
- [07] Substantially improved overall combat training readiness
- [18] Improved overall combat training readiness
- [06] No impact
- [30] Minimally degraded combat training readiness
- [08] Substantially degraded combat training readiness
- 16. Which skills were significantly: enhanced/degraded/no change by the OOTW: (select all that apply)

 Individual [33] Enhanced [24] Degraded [04] Same

 Crew [32] Enhanced [23] Degraded [03] Same

 Squad [32] Enhanced [22] Degraded [05] Same

 Platoon [28] Enhanced [17] Degraded [11] Same

 Company [18] Enhanced [28] Degraded [11] Same

 Battalion [13] Enhanced [31] Degraded [08] Same

other: specify:

- 17. To what extent did your <u>OOTW tasks complement and/or replicate</u> your critical go-to-war tasks:
- [05] Not at all
- [12] To a small degree
- [18] To some degree
- [26] To a great degree
- 18. During the OOTW, were normal Unit Status Report (USR) reporting standards and criteria used to report readiness:
 - [54] Yes
 - [13] No
- (specify):

POST DEPLOYMENT

These questions apply to those who either deployed, or joined a unit in post-deployment recovery:

- 19. After your unit returned, how long was your unit's <u>dedicated</u> recovery period:
- [14] no recovery
- [09] 1 week
- [13] 2 weeks
- [07] 3 weeks
- [18] 1 month
- [06] 2 months
- [13] _1.5 to >5_ months
- 20. Was the <u>time allotted sufficient</u> to restore your unit to <u>full</u> combat readiness in the following categories:

Personnel: [54] Yes [18] No Equipment: [43] Yes [28] No Training: [36] Yes [35] No

- 21. If your unit experienced <u>degraded unit training after</u> the OOTW, what were the main factors, (training detractors), which impacted (please list):
- (a)
- (b)
- (c)
- (d)
- (e)
- 22. How was your unit's training readiness assessed after recovery:
 -Select One -
- [11] ARTEP
- [12] CTC rotation
- [35] Cdr.'s Eval
- [03] BCTP
- [21] Exercises
- [11] not assessed
- [03] other (specify)
- 23. After the OOTW, did you notice a measurable impact with your unit's physical fitness:
- [05] Large Improvement
- [09] Small Improvement
- [27] No impact
- [19] Small decrease
- [12] Large decrease

- 24. How many <u>weeks</u> after the return of your unit do you believe it would have been able <u>to successfully execute</u> a(n):
- a. ARTEP: average 6.7 weeks with 73 respondents
- b. CTC Rotation(NTC/CMTC/JRTC): average 6.6 weeks with 63 respondents
 - c. MRC: average 7.4 weeks with 68 respondents
- 25. Had your unit been called upon to deploy to an MRC <u>prior</u> to the time you listed above, do you think the impact of <u>training readiness</u> <u>shortfalls</u> would have resulted in:
- [01] Mission failure
- [04] Mission success with significant casualties
- [28] Mission success with moderate casualties
- [35] Mission success with few casualties
- 26. Do you believe that OOTW tasks should be included in unit METLs:
- [52] Yes
- [31] No
- 27. Given realistic time constraints, what percent of your warfighting METL tasks are you willing to neglect in order to train to these OOTW tasks:

[14]	No	ne			[03] 51 - 60 %
[22]	1	_	10	ક્ર	[00] 61 - 70 %
[10]	11	_	20	ક્ર	[00] 71 - 80%
[16]	21	_	30	용	[00] 81 - 90 %
[09]	31	_	40	ક્ર	[00] 91 - 100 %
[01]	41	_	50	ક્ર	[] 100 0

28. Are there any other <u>OOTW training readiness issues</u> you would like to comment on?

Thanks for your help.

Please return to BOX 282, NLT 24 November 1997.

For additional information, you may contact me via ccmail (walshmj1) or at 240-0619.

Appendix C: Critical OOTW Tasks

SURVEY RESPONSES TO QUESTION #6 LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS NOT IN UNIT METL

Run Opns Base Provide Fire Support For A Multi-National Division Conduct Info Opns Civil Military C2 Mine Operations Political Sensitivity Est. Road Blocks/Checkpoints Convoy Opns Inspection of Former Warring Faction Bases Establish and mark a zone of separation Check Point Operations Explosive Ordnance Disposal Crowd Control Road Clearance Alert, Assemble And Deploy Forces Mine Awareness Air Craft, Boat ID For Equipment Generic To Region Provide Ouick Reaction Force Coordination With NGOs Riot Control PSO PKO Check Point Opns ARCENT SA Tactical SOPs For Air Defense Operations Establish And Operate Migrant Camps Aggressive Patrolling Verify Deploying/Redeploying Forces Establish Force Field Arty Hq For A Division Conduct Joint Military Commission Meetings Civil Works Check Point Construction And Operation Pull (Vice Push) Logistics Peace Enforcement - Separation Huge Number Of Tasks Weapons Storage Site Inspections Contract Construction Haul Debris Coordinate Fire Support Coordination W/ Multinational Force Hqtrs & Local Provide Urban Patrolling MP Type Tasks ROE W/ Respect To US Citizens

SURVEY RESPONSES TO QUESTION #6 LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS NOT IN UNIT METL

Negotiations
Conduct Split Base Operations
Employ Target Acquisition In OOTW
Joint Military Commission Operations
Real Estate
C2 Recovery Opns
Conduct Targeting Operations In A Joint Force
Coordination W/ Forces From Other Countries
Provide Critical Site Security

Appendix D: Training Detractors Post-deployment

SURVEY RESPONSES TO QUESTION 21: Post-deployment Training Detractors

- -Availability Of Ranges
- -BCTP Train-Up, Div Level Warfighter Took Key Leaders Out For 30 Days
- -Collective Training Due To New Equipment
- -Competing Demands (PFP)
- -Equipment Shortages Equipment Left In Theater
- -Follow On OOTW
- -Funding
- -Key Personnel Shortage
- -Loss Of Key Personnel Impacted Performance At All Levels
- -Maintenance
- -No Time For Wpns Qual. And Other Required Training
- -No Wpns Qual
- -Other Taskings In The Bde
- -Personnel Requirements I.E. Appts
- -Personnel Shortages
- -Personnel Turnover
- -Post Support Missions
- -Return Of Equipment
- -Scheduled Exercises Bde Eval, JRTC, Deployment To Thailand
- -Support To Next Deploying Unit
- -TF Was Disbanded/Reorganized After Opn
- -Theater Transportation Support Continued W/O Decline
- -Unable To Maintain Bn Mvr And Bde Fire Support
- -Unfilled Personnel Shortages
- -Unit Drawdown (Inactivation)

SURVEY RESPONSES TO QUESTION 21: Post-deployment Training Detractors cont.

- -Went Right Back To Business As Usual
- -Unexpected Training Requirements (Train Tank Bn For ABLE SENTRY) Disrupted Calendar For Six Weeks
- -Massive Rotation Of Leaders Throughout Organization
- -Inadequate Time To Train Up For Bde Fire Support
- -Turbulence/Turn Over
- -Support Commitments
- -Lack Of Access To Training Areas
- -Shortage Of Replacement Personnel
- -Lack Of Maneuver Training
- -Installation Skills Suffered At Crew Level
- -Spare Parts
- -Waiting For Equipment To Return
- -Equipment Left In OOTW Caused Shortages
- -Loss Of Key Personnel
- -Maintenance
- -Lack Of Training Areas
- -Critical Equipment Shortages Returning From Somalia
- -Weather At Ft. Drum Prevented Some Training Events
- -Last Minute Taskings
- SURVEY RESPONSES TO QUESTION 21:

Post-deployment Training Detractors

- -Bn CI Scheduled And Rescheduled Twice
- -Preparation For AWE
- -Change Of Commands
- -BCTP SPT
- -Retrain To Wartime ROE
- -Equipment Upgrades And NET
- -Personnel Recovery
- -Last Minute Support Missions

Appendix E: Other OOTW Training Readiness Issues

SURVEY RESPONSES TO QUESTION 28:
Other Comments

Turnover/turbulence/delayed change of command are significant issues. The fact that you don't take your own equipment is also a consideration

SURVEY RESPONSES TO QUESTION 28: Other Comments

Even though there are crossover skills, OOTW task/training are different than war tasks; therefore, they are additive to METL, not substitutes or subsumed in other training.

Each mission is different

This OOTW allowed more flight time, a/c very busy

My unit supported 1st AD w/ Plt size force

Units deploying to Macedonian or Bosnia normally would take at least one year to restore ability to mvr at the TF level and effectively employ combat multipliers i.e. fire support.

We need to come up with other options for executing OOTW, particularly PK and PM. For example, why not designate two divisions in JSCP as forces for PKO.

Many health Service's METL tasks carry into OUGHT as well as warfighting.

MP force complements OOTW mission closely; tasks are divergent of OOTW into degrees of intensity.

OOTW for CS/CSS unit is same as for MRC in most respects. Particularly for signal, Log units

For a CSS unit, almost all METL tasks could be performed during OOTW. Tasks and standards remain the same, only the conditions change.

Both units were better prepared for their wartime mission after the experience

For a MI Bn, we were doing our warfighting tasks, deploy, Intel ops, sustain

Personnel tasking for OOTW for linguist, interpreters, liaison, escorts, security, JTFHQ etc. also impacted on unit mission and training

engineers do MP and infantry tasks in OOTW need to train both as part of slice and separately

SURVEY RESPONSES TO QUESTION 28: Other Comments

Don't forget the backfill of OOTW deployed troops. When folks deploy GS Arty unit spent months doing post support.

Started losing skills at company level as requirements were for a few A/Cs. ATK Helo pilots quickly lost gunnery skills. Minimal Combined arms ops.

Force Protection is critical and must be balanced within the $\ensuremath{\mathsf{ROE}}$